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STATE STREET BANK & TRUST CO. V.
SIGNATURE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.:
OUGHT THE MATHEMATICAL ALGORITHM
AND BUSINESS METHOD EXCEPTIONS
RETURN TO BUSINESS AS USUAL?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past, inventors have had to rely on the concepts of
copyright and trademark to protect their software related business
activities from appropriation by competitors. However, after a
series of recent developments culminating with the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc.,' companies and inventors alike
may now consider seeking patent protection for their software.
The opinion, authored by Judge Giles S. Rich, may have far
reaching effects on the financial industry, as it explicitly endorses
patent protection for computer implemented "business methods."2
In particular, in a single sweep, the opinion removed long-standing
barriers to patents that encompass business methods, by holding
that such inventions constitute patentable subject matter if they
merely produce a "useful, concrete and tangible result."' Addition-
ally, the State Street court grasped the opportunity to abandon
another time-honored test for statutory subject matter, the so-called
Freeman-Walter-Abele test that previously had served as a litmus-
test for unpatentable mathematical algorithms.4
The discussion will begin with the historical development and
evolution of the business method and mathematical algorithm
exceptions, followed by an analysis of recent trends leading to the
State Street decision. The commentary then includes a few modest
predictions of what the future may hold with respect to the
financial and Internet commerce industries in the wake of -the
1 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W.
3302 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1999) (No. 98-657).
2 Id. at 1375.
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decision. Finally, the note concludes with a discussion pertaining
to the wisdom of a permanent removal of the business method
exception.
II. THE WINDING ROAD OF PRECEDENTS
A. PATENTS GENERALLY
Article one, Section 8 of the United States Constitution authoriz-
es the Congress to establish a patent protection regime in order to
promote "the Progress of Science" by granting inventors exclusive
use of their inventions for "limited Times."5 Congress, in turn,
created a patent protection scheme codified in Title 35 of the
United States Code, which states in part that subject to specific
limitations, patent monopoly is available for processes, machines,
manufacture, and compositions of matter.6 A patent successfully
prosecuted in the Patent and Trademark Office thus grants to an
inventor the exclusive rights to make, use, and sell the invention
for a term of up to twenty years.7 Another benefit of patent
protection is that, unlike the case for copyrights, even independent-
ly developed inventions infringe the work of an inventor.8
Under the constitutional grant to create a system of patent
protection, Congress has enacted several iterations of the Patent
Act,9 and the current Act declares that in order to qualify for
patent protection, an invention must satisfy the requirements of
utility, ° novelty," nonobviousness, 2 and enablement.13  Addi-
tionally, the invention at issue must fall into a category of so-called
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1998).
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1998).
a PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAw FUNDAMENTALs § 1.03[6] at 1-24 rev. (1998) (stating
that the copyright monopoly "only excludes others from 'copying' ").
' The Patent Act was originally enacted in 1790 (Patent Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1
Stat. 109) and underwent its most recent major revision in 1952 (Patent Act of July 19, 1952,
ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, Pub. L. 82-593).
10 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
" 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
12 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
13 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). See generally Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383
U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966) (holding that validity of patent depends on
satisfaction of all statutory requirements).
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BUSINESS METHOD EXCEPTIONS
patentable subject matter. 14 A literal reading of § 101 of the
Patent Act, which describes, in general terms, what constitutes
patentable inventions, does not disclose any statutory limitation to
the subject matter of patent as "[wihoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of [the
Patent Act]."'5 Indeed, the notable decision in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty6 construed § 101 of the Patent Act to "include
anything under the sun that is made by man." 7 However, the
Court was quick to point out that § 101 is not completely without
boundaries.'" Rather, the determination of what constitutes
patentable subject matter is the product of a long judicial evolution-
ary process. For example, one fundamental rule prohibits patents
for abstract ideas. This rule appears to derive from the traditional
notion that patents are intended to encompass devices or physical
items in the useful arts rather than concepts in the theoretical
realm. This principle was articulated by the Supreme Court in
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard:9 [an idea of itself is not
patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically
useful is."2" Similarly, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court
stated that
[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas have been held not patentable. Thus,
a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant
found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.
Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated
law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the
law of gravity. Such discoveries are "manifestations
14 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAw BASICS § 6.01 at 6-1 (1992).
15 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (emphasis added).
16 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980).
1 Id. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923,
2d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)).
18 Id.
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of... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusive-
ly to none."2
Thus, over the years, the courts have announced and modified
patentable subject matter rules generally as well as particular and
specific restrictions, such as those which address patents for
business methods and mathematical algorithms.
B. THE BUSINESS METHOD EXCEPTION
The business method exception to patentable subject matter
seems to originate from the related rules against patents for
"printed matter" and "business methods." The rules evolved from
a series of cases in which patent claims were asserted for new
printed business forms.22 For example, in a case involving a
patent for a means of credit insurance, the court struck down the
patent since
[tihere is nothing peculiar or novel in preparing a
sheet of paper with headings generally appropriate
to classes of facts to be recorded, and whatever
peculiarity there may be about the headings in this
case is a peculiarity resulting from the transactions
themselves.. . . Given a series of transactions, there
is no patentable novelty in recording them, where, as
in this case, such record consists simply in setting
down some of their details in an order or sequence
common to each record.2
21 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. 127, 130, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 280, 281 (1948)). See also O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 62, 112 (1853) (denying Samuel Morse's famous claim for the use of "electro
magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or
letters, at any distances" because the claim was for the use of magnetism without regard to
any specific process and thus represented merely an idea).
22 In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668,9 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 181 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (holding unpatentable
directories with surnames indexed in a certain manner); United States Credit Sys. Co. v.
American Credit Indem. Co., 59 F. 139 (2d Cir. 1893) (holding unpatentable business forms
with appropriate headings). See ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 155 (1997).
23 United States Credit Sys. Co., 59 F. at 143. One justification for the printed matter
exception is that "it is necessary to 'channel' certain creations into the realm of patent law,
and other creations (notably those in written form) into copyright law." MERGES ET AL.,
supra note 22, at 155.
[Vol. 6:359
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Similarly, courts held that systems of transacting business were not
patentable subject matter, unless, of course, the claims were for the
physical execution of a new system. Hotel Security Checking Co. v.
Lorraine Co. 24 is generally considered the origin for the business
method exception. 2' The subject of the patent claim was termed
a" 'method of and means for cash-registering and account-checking'
designed to prevent frauds and peculation by waiters and cashiers
in hotels and restaurants."26  The court stated that it was mani-
fest that the subject matter of the claims was not for the traditional
classes of machines, manufacture or compositions of matter. Thus,
the court concluded, "[ilf within the language of the statute at all,
it must be as a 'new and useful art.' "2' The court proceeded: "In
the sense of the patent law, an art is not a mere abstraction. A
system of transacting business disconnected from the means for
carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal interpreta-
tion of the term, an art."28 The court reiterated its view that "[n]o
mere abstraction, no idea, however brilliant, can be the subject of
a patent irrespective of the means designed to give it effect."29
With this single sentence, the Hotel Security Checking court halted,
if only temporarily, the expansion of the scope of patent protection,
Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
2Although courts had invalidated claims for printed materials to be used as a part of a
business method before the Hotel Security decision, none of the earlier courts held that any
exception for "methods of doing business" existed. Michael L. Fuelling, Manufacturing,
Selling, and Accounting: Patenting Business Methods, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
471, 482 (1994). See, e.g., Munson v. City of New York, 124 U.S. 601 (1888) (finding no
novelty in a method for preserving, filing, and cancelling bonds by pasting them in blank
books); United States Credit Sys. Co., 59 F. at 139 (finding no novelty in claim for a form
contract to insure merchants' transactions); Hocke v. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 122 F.
467 (2d Cir. 1903) (invalidating a claim for a means to secure against loss of freight by using
receipts for obviousness).
"Hotel Sec. Checking Co., 160 F. at 467. Under the system, the object of the invention
was to accurately check the account of the cashier and of each waiter. Id. at 467. In
carrying out the system, each waiter was provided with slips of paper while the person in
charge of each department was provided with a sheet of paper ruled lengthwise in parallel
columns, each waiter having a particular column exclusively appropriated to him. Id. Quite
simply, the amounts of food removed from the kitchen would be entered by the supervisor
on the sheets, and the entries would then be compared with the tally of each individual
waiter to determine if any "dishonesty" occurred and if so, where the fault lies. Id. at 467-68.
27 Id. at 469.
2Id. (emphasis added).
,Id. (citing Fowler v. City of New York, 121 F. 747, 748 (2d Cir. 1903)).
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and, more importantly, it gave birth to the business methods
exception to patentable subject matter which would come to last for
a century.3 °
The combined effect of the dual doctrines prohibiting patents for
printed matter and business methods is that most business and
financial innovations have been considered simply unpatentable.3'
In fact, as a recent case pointed out, the 1994 Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure stated the view of the Patent and Trademark
Office accordingly in quite unambiguous language: "[tihough
seemingly within the category of process or method, a method of
doing business can be rejected as not being within the statutory
classes."32
A classic case adhering to the business method doctrine was
Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc.33 The
dispute arose when a patent was sought for a scheme for parking
automobiles in an open lot to improve the view of a drive-in movie
screen for all patrons.' The lower court upheld the validity of the
patent,35 evidently impressed by its novelty.36 The case was,
however, promptly reversed by the First Circuit, which stated that
30 See, e.g., 1 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, WALKER ON PATENTS § 2:17 at 171 (3d
ed. 1984) ([A] 'system' or method of transacting business is not an 'art,' nor does it come
within any other designation of patentable subject matter... apart from the physical means
of conducting the system."); ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 6-82 ("Whereas an apparatus or
system capable of performing a business function may comprise patentable subject matter,
the law remains that a method or doing business whether or not generated by an apparatus
or system does not constitute patentable subject matter.").
"i See Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PIrr. L. REv. 959, 964
(1986) (stating that "lilt is thought to be black-letter law that a 'system of transacting
business disconnected from the means for carrying out the system' does not constitute
patentable subject matter") (quoting Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d
Cir. 1900)).
2 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377,
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1604 (quoting MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §
706.03(a) (West 1994)).
3 Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 81 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 149 (1st Cir. 1949).
Id. at 550.
' Park-In Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 880, 72 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 470 (D. R.I. 1947).
' Rinaldo Del Gallo, III, Are "Methods of Doing Business" Finally Out of Business as a
Statutory Rejection?" 38 IDEA- J.L. & TECH. 403 at 414 (1998).
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[tihis arcuate arrangement of parking stalls in a lot
is obviously only an adaptation to automobiles of the
conventional arrangement of seats in a theatre
employed since ancient times to enable patrons to
see the performance ... [A] system for the transac-
tion of business, such, for example, as the cafeteria
system for transacting the restaurant business ...
however novel, useful, or commercially successful is
not patentable apart from the means for making the
system practically useful. . .. "
As a result of the court's explicit directive to prohibit business
methods patents, Loew's is often cited for the proposition that
business methods in general are not patentable.38 It is exactly
these kinds of blanket assertions by courts and legal scholars alike
that distilled the doctrine to such a degree of clarity that the
business methods exception had become "hornbook" law cast in
stone by the time that recent decisions came to cast the doctrine
into doubt.
C. THE MATHEMATICAL ALGORITHM EXCEPTION
Another limit to patentable subject matter thought to be well
established until the State Street decision pertains to claims that
encompass mathematical algorithms. Three general categories of
unpatentable subject matter have crystallized from Supreme Court
precedent: "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas."39 As a subset of the general prohibition against patents for
mere expressions of abstract ideas, mathematical algorithms have
traditionally been considered unpatentable subject matter. 0
1. The Gottschalk Trilogy of Cases. The mathematical algorithm
exception is generally thought to have originated in the case of
3 Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d at 552 (emphasis
added).
' See, e.g., State St. Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp.
502, 515, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1530, 1542 (D. Mass. 1996).
" Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S. Ct. 1048.
40 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373,
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (1998) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 101 S. Ct. 1048).
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Gottschalk v. Benson.4 In that case, the United States Supreme
Court held that a method for converting binary-coded decimal
numerals into pure binary numerals42 with the use of a computer
was not patentable subject matter.43 In particular, the court held
that since the claimed mathematical formula had no significant
practical application without a computer, "the patent would wholly
pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be
a patent on the algorithm itself."" Additionally, the court de-
clared that a transformation of an article "to a different state or
thing" is the basic requirement for the patentability of a process
claim that does not include particular machines.45 The Gottschalk
court stated that "[pihenomena of nature, though just discovered,
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological
work."46 Thus, the court held, the grant of patent protection for
the use of a scientific principle, rather than for a specific applica-
tion, would impede rather than promote the progress of science.47
The second case in what has been called "the Supreme Court
Trilogy"48 of cases considering patent protection for software was
Parker v. Flook.4'9  The Parker Court held that the claim for a
mathematical process to calculate alarm limits for a chemical
process merely was a known mathematical algorithm tailored to a
41 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1972).
42 The process of replacing the old relays in telephone networks with computerized
switches required the programming of computers to perform telephone functions. Garner et
al., Advanced Claim Drafting and Amendment Writing Workshop for Electronics and
Computer-Related Subject Matter, 501 P.L.I. 229, 239 (1998). Relevant to the Benson case
was the process of converting the decimal digits of a phone call to binary digits usable by the
computers. Id. The patent at issue was the algorithm to make this conversion. Id.
' 409 U.S. at 71-72.
"Id. at 72.
Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
4Id. at 67. The Gottschalk court did not hold that computer software programs could
never be patentable, but it did state that "transformation and reduction of an article 'to a
different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not
include particular machines." 409 U.S at 70. Thus, the mere processing of numbers by a
mathematical equation on a computer did not constitute patentable subject matter as no
transformation or reduction had taken place.
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (patent and copyright clause).
" State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 508,
38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1530, 1535 (D. Mass 1996).
41 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1978).
366 [Vol. 6:359
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"post-solution activity."" In other words, the court considered the
claim as an attempt to transform an unpatentable scientific
principle into a patentable process by cladding it in a practical
invention." The effective result of the decision was to extend the
Gottschalk rule such that not only were mathematical algorithms
not patentable, but most any process utilizing such algorithms was
invalidated as well.
The third and final installment of the Supreme Court trilogy
came three years later in Diamond v. Diehr,52 which restricted the
application of the Benson-Parker analysis. The claim was for a
process that used a computer to apply a well-known mathematical
formula to calculate the termination point for a rubber curing
process.53 The analysis of the Parker Court likely would have
concluded that the claim merely was for an "improved method of
calculation."54 Thus, although the formula was tied to a specific
end use, the Parker analysis would in all likelihood have found the
invention to be unpatentable subject matter under § 101." The
Diamond Court, however, drew a distinction from the Gottschalk
and Parker decisions by declaring that the algorithm at issue did
not merely calculate abstract numerical values, but rather "in-
volve[d] the transformation of an article, in this case raw, uncured
synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing."56 The Court
declared that "when a claim recites a mathematical formula (or
scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be
made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that
'0 Id. at 590. The claimed process updated the alarm limits at which the chemical
reactions involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons become unstable. Id. at 585.
'
1 Id. at 590. The Court elaborated: "A competent draftsman could attach some form of
post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would
not have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application contained a
final step indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing
surveying techniques." Id. at 590.
'2 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981).
5See State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 509 ("The process involved a well-known mathematical
formula [the Arrhenius formula] coupled with constant measurement of temperature inside
a mold; a computer calculated ongoing changes in temperature and automatically terminated
the curing process at the proper point with a degree of precision theretofore unknown in the
art.").
" Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595 n.18.
5Id.
"Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184 (emphasis added).
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formula in the abstract. A mathematical formula as such is not
accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle
cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment."57
This has been dubbed the preemption inquiry, by which a
software patent incorporating a mathematical algorithm must not
preempt the "human use of [the] equation by 'head and hand'.""8
The Diamond Court continued:
On the other hand, when a claim containing a
mathematical formula implements or applies that
formula in a structure or process which, when
considered as a whole, is performing a function
which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g.,
transforming or reducing an article to a different
state or thing), then the claim satisfies the require-
ments of [section] 101."
Thus, Diamond made clear that the physical transformation
alluded to in Gottschalk6 ° and Parker6 was a prerequisite to
such kinds of patent protection. Consequently, all software patents
utilizing mathematical algorithms must satisfy this "transformation
inquiry."62
2. The Gottschalk Doctrine Implemented: The Freeman-Walter-
Abele Test. To determine whether the claimed subject matter
constitutes an unpatentable mathematical algorithm according to
the principles developed in the Gottschalk-Parker-Diamond trilogy,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) formulated a
57 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191.
' Jur Strobos, Stalking the Elusive Patentable Software: Are there still Diehr or was it
just a Flook?, 6 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 363, 387 (1993) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 187,
191).
69 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192.
60 409 U.S. 63, 70, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 676 (1972).
61 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 (1978).
62 Strobos, supra note 58, at 387 (stating that "[tihe second [inquiry] addresses whether
the particular claimed use is a process with a product, or a transformation and reduction of
a particular entity, such as input data, to a different state, rather than an idea or 'patent
protection for that formula in the abstract'." (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S at 184, 187, 191)).
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second trio of cases, logically entitled the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test.' In 1978, the Freeman court stated that
[f]irst, it must be determined whether the claim
directly or indirectly recites an 'algorithm' in the
[Gottschalk] sense of that term, for a claim which
fails even to recite an algorithm clearly cannot
wholly preempt an algorithm. Second, the claim
must be further analyzed to ascertain whether in its
entirety it wholly preempts that algorithm."
Two years later, the Walter court modified the second step of the
Freeman test ever so slightly:
If it appears that the mathematical algorithm is
implemented in a specific manner to define structur-
al relationships between physical elements of the
claim ... or to refine or limit claim steps . . ., the
claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes
muster under [section] 101. If, however, the mathe-
matical algorithm is merely presented and solved by
the claimed invention, as was the case in [Gotts-
chalk] and [Parker], and is not applied in any man-
ner to physical elements or process steps, no amount
of post-solution activity will render the claim statuto-
ry; nor is it saved by a preamble merely reciting the
field of use of the mathematical algorithm.'
Finally, in 1982, the C.C.P.A. expanded the second prong such that
it only applied to claims in which structural relationships or
process steps were defined, limited, or refined by the application of
the algorithm." The court stated that "if the claim would be
'otherwise statutory' . . . albeit inoperative or less useful without
63 The test refers to a composite of three cases: In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682 (C.C.P-. 1982).
' In re Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245.
6 In re Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
66 In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 907.
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the algorithm, the claim likewise presents statutory subject matter
when the algorithm is included."67
The final version of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test was articulat-
ed in the State Street Bank case as follows:
First, the claim is analyzed to determine whether a
mathematical algorithm is directly or indirectly
recited. Next, if a mathematical algorithm is found,
the claim as a whole is further analyzed to determine
whether the algorithm is 'applied in any manner to
physical elements or process steps,' and, if it is, it
'passes muster under [section] 101.168
In other words, under the second inquiry, if the mathematical
algorithm is applied to one or more elements of an otherwise
statutory process claim, the requirements of § 101 are met. 9
Thus, in order to identify unpatentable mathematical algorithms,
one must show that "they are merely abstract ideas constituting
disembodied concepts or truths that are not 'useful.' "7o In practi-
cal terms, this means that the patentability of an algorithm hinges
on its application in a "useful" way.
Examples of what constitutes a "useful" way can be found in
cases such as In re Alappat71 and Arrhythmia Research Technolo-
gy Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.72 In re Alappat involved a mathemati-
cal algorithm that transformed data from an electrical input signal
to produce a smooth waveform display on a monitor.73 In other
words, the algorithm "massaged" the information from the input
67 id.
' State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915, 214 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 673, 675-76 (C.C.P-. 1982)), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1999) (No.
98-657).
In re Schrader, 22 F. 3d 290, 292, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1455, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1994).70 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373.
71 In re Alappat 33 F.3d 1526, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
72 Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
73 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1537.
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signal to be displayed more clearly on an oscilloscope.7 4 The court
held that the calculations constituted a practical application of the
abstract underlying idea, because the smooth waveform on the
monitor constituted "a useful, concrete and tangible result."7 5
The invention at issue in Arrhythmia similarly constituted a
practical application of an abstract idea. The invention processed
electrocardiograph (EKG) signals from patients' heartbeats through
a series of calculations and the final result, output information for
heart activity, was the useful, concrete, or tangible thing because
it represented the condition of a patient's heart. 6
A contrasting example of a patent claim for computer software
that failed the Freeman-Walter-Abele test is found in In re Schrad-
er.77 The case concerned a claim for a way of conducting auctions,
where the sales revenue was maximized by a method which would
compute the highest value of a plurality of items such as contigu-
ous tracts of land.7'  The method simply employed linear mathe-
matical programming' to calculate the sum total of the bids for
the parcels sold independently, or alternatively, the total value of
the parcels if sold in consolidated groups, the idea being that a
tract of land might be more valuable to a purchaser if it could be
secured as a contiguous group.80
, Id. at 1537. "[The invention] eliminat[ed] any apparent discontinuity, jaggedness or
oscillation in the waveform, thus giving the visual appearance of a smooth continuous
waveform." Id.
" Id. at 1544. The invention improved the output on the screen of a digital oscilloscope
through the use of calculations to "transform, i.e., rasterize, digitized waveforms (data) into
anti-aliased, pixel illumination data to produce a smooth waveform." Id.
76 Electrodes attached to the patient's body detect the heart's electrical signals in
accordance with the various phases of heart activity. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1054-55.
These analog signals were converted to digital form and were processed mathematically to
detect the signals that represent an acute type of heart arrhythmia known as ventricular
tachycardia. Id.7 In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
7 8 Id. at 291.
7' "Linear programming is a known procedure for solving business problems involving
profit maximization." Id., at 293 n.7 (citing 12 McGRAW HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY, at 385-387 (6th ed. 1987)).
so Id., at 291:
For example, in an auction involving two contiguous tracts of land, tracts
1 and 2, the following bids might be received and recorded: Bid
1--$100,000 for tract 1 by bidder A; Bid 2--$200,000 for tract 2 by bidder
B; and Bid 3--$250,000 for both tracts 1 and 2 by bidder C. The
13
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Schrader argued that "the method physically regroups raw bids
into new groupings [and, therefore,] physically transforms bid data
into completion data or display data."8'
The court found the argument unpersuasive as it held there was
"nothing physical about bids per se."82 Thus, as "the grouping or
regrouping of bids [could not] constitute a physical change, effect,
or result," the court could not find any kind of physical transforma-
tion of data.8" The court acknowledged that for purposes of
section 101, the claims were "indistinguishable from the claims
involving the manipulation of data representing CAT scan images
held patentable in [Abele]."' However, the court held that the
distinction arose in the fact that Abele involved the "transformation
or conversion of subject matter representative of or constituting
physical activity or objects,"85 whereby the court strictly adhered
to the physical transformation prong of the two-part Freeman-
Walter-Abele test.86
The examples show how strictly the clear directives of the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test have been followed, illustrating the
degree of validity that the courts have accorded it until the very
recent developments that eventually resulted in its removal from
the doctrinal toolbox.
III. MODERN DEVELOPMENT
A. THE BUSINESS METHOD EXCEPTION
Until very recently, court decisions have shown continued
support for, and adherence to, the vitality of the business methods
exception. For example, In re Alappat stated in dicta that "busi-
combination of bids that maximizes the revenue to the seller, and thus
the combination of bids that forms the "completion," would be bids 1 and
2. Id.
8 Schrader, 22 F.3d at 293.
8 Id. at 293-94.
83 Id. at 294.
8 Id.
8M Id.
Id. Thus, the court subscribed to the notion that "[tlhe concept of patentable subject
matter under § 101 is not 'like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any
direction.'" Id. (citing White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886)).
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ness methodology" is not [section] 101 subject matter.87
However, the business method exception was rather sharply
criticized in Judge Newman's dissent to the Federal Circuit's
analysis of In re Schrader:
[Tihe Board [of Patent Appeals and Interferences]
remarked that the "method of doing business" is a
fuzzy concept, observed the inconclusiveness of
precedent, and sought guidance from this court.
Indeed it is fuzzy. ... The decisions that have
spoken of "methods of doing business" have, or could
have, resolved the issue in each case simply by
relying on the statutory requirements of patentabili-
ty such as novelty and unobviousness.'
Judge Newman explained that "[t]he cases simply reaffirm that the
patent system is directed to tangible things and procedures, not
mere ideas."89 In particular, she pointed out that the court in the
Hotel Security Checking case, often cited as establishing the
business methods exception to patentable subject matter, discussed
the obviousness of the record keeping system at considerably
greater detail and length than whether the subject matter was
statutory.90 Thus, she concluded, the Hotel Security Checking
court's lack of sufficient analysis on the point of statutory subject
matter supported her assertion that "the jurisprudence does not
require the creation of a distinct business class of unpatentable
subject matter."
The Hotel Security Checking court held that the fundamental
"' In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1541, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(noting that "[one case] dealt with a business methodology for deciding how salesmen should
best handle respective customers and [another case] involved a 'system' for aiding a
neurologist in diagnosing patients. Clearly, neither of the alleged 'inventions' in those cases
falls within any [section] 101 category." Id. See also, Exparte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1819, 1820 (PTO Bd. Of Patent App. & Int. 1988) (stating that "[slome inventions, however
meritorious, do not constitute patentable subject matter, e.g..... methods of doing business."
(citing In re Wait, 22 C.C.P.A. 822, 73 F.2d 982, 24 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 88 (1934)).
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principle of the invention was "as old as the art of bookkeeping, i.e.,
charging the goods of the employer to the agent who takes
them."s2 Thus, in effect, the patent was declared invalid for
simple lack of novelty/obviousness rather than for lack of patent-
able subject matter. In fact, as Judge Newman points out, the
court did not assume any position on the matter of whether the
patent claim in fact constituted patentable subject matter.9 3 Thus,
it seems clear that nearly one century's worth of case law and
commentary on the business method doctrine has been based on a
mere dictum.
Judge Newman further declared that as of the date of the
Schrader decision, no court had disqualified a patent for a novel
and non-obvious method or process solely because it represents a
business method.94 Rather, she claimed, most court decisions that
refer to the business method exception rely on the basic notion that
mere ideas without physical embodiments cannot be protected by
patent.95
An excellent illustration of Judge Newman's point is Loew's
Drive-In Theatre, a case thought to support the business method
doctrine while actually disposing of the claimed invention for lack
of novelty.96 The court stated that the invention at issue might
constitute a business method, but ultimately invalidated the claim
for a system of pointing cars at a drive-in movie theatre toward the
screen for lack of novelty.9 v
Echoing the modern rethinking of the business method exception
in the courts, the 1996 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure was
recently revised to exclude the following paragraph from section
9' Hotel Sec. Checking, Inc. v. Lorraine, 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908).
' In re Schrader 22 F.3d at 298, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1455, 1462 (1994) (referring to Hotel
Security, 160 F. at 472 (holding that "if at the time of [the] application, there had been no
system of bookkeeping of any kind in restaurants, we would be confronted with the question
whether a new and useful system of cash-registering and account-checking is such an art as
is patentable under the statute.")).
9 Id. at 298.
9 Id.
9 Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 81 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 149 (1st Cir. 1949).
97 Id. at 552. "This arcuate arrangement of parking stalls in a lot is obviously only an
adaptation to automobiles of the conventional arrangement of seats in a theatre employed
since ancient times to enable patrons to see the performance while looking comfortably ahead
in normal sitting position without twisting the body or turning the head." Id.
374 [Vol. 6:359
16
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol6/iss2/6
BUSINESS METHOD EXCEPTIONS
706.03(a): 'Though seemingly within the category of process or
method, a method of doing business can be rejected as not being
within the statutory classes." 8 Additionally, the Examination
Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, published and
effective in 1996, states that "[olffice personnel have had difficulty
in properly treating claims directed to methods of doing busi-
ness."99 To remedy this problem, the guidelines suggest that
"[c]laims should not be categorized as methods of doing busi-
ness." °° Rather, "such claims should be treated like any other
process claims, pursuant to [the] Guidelines." 101 Although the
Guidelines do not have the force of law,0 2 and while any poten-
tial failure by the Patent and Trademark Office personnel to follow
the Guidelines is neither appealable nor petitionable, 03 the
Guidelines are "based on the Office's current understanding of the
law and are believed to be fully consistent with binding precedent
of the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit and the Federal Circuit's
predecessor courts.""°  Thus, as due consideration should be
afforded the PTO's understanding of the applicable laws and
precedent, the only possible conclusion is that the business method
exception seems to have eroded over the course of a century to the
point of documented extinction as of the guideline revisions of
1996.105 Thus, it was only a matter of time before a court would
step into the limelight and sound the death knell for a doctrine
considered by many as ailing and deserving to be put out of its
misery. 0
9 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377,
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1604, cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1999) (No. 98-
657) (quoting Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 706.03(a) (August 1993) (citing Hotel
Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908) and In re Wait, 24 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 88, 22 C.C.P.A. 822 (1934))).
" Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479
(1996).
10 Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7479.
101 Id.
"o
3 Id. See also In re Trovato, 60 F.3d at 807 (suggesting that while the Guidelines do not
have the force and effect of law, they may serve as persuasive authority).
103 61 Fed. Reg. at 7479.
104 id.
"
0 0 The Guidelines were published in the Federal Register on February 28, 1996, and took
effect on March 29, 1996.
"
06 See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1455, 1462 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that the business method "merits retirement from
the glossary of section 101.").
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B. THE MATHEMATICAL ALGORITHM EXCEPTION
The Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions
also articulate the current understanding of the Patent and
Trademark Office regarding the patentability of software incorpo-
rating mathematical algorithms." 7 The Guidelines state that "a
process that merely manipulates an abstract idea or performs a
purely mathematical algorithm is non-statutory despite the fact
that it might inherently have some usefulness."' In other
words, this is the familiar prohibition against patents for abstract
ideas articulated in the Gottschalk-Parker-Diamond trilogy.'0 °
The guidelines also adopt the physical transformation test from the
Freeman-Walter-Abele line of decisions:110
If the 'acts' of a claimed process manipulate only
numbers, abstract concepts or ideas, or signals
representing any of the foregoing, the acts are not
being applied to appropriate subject matter. Thus,
a process consisting solely of mathematical opera-
tions, [that is], converting one set of numbers into
another set of numbers, does not manipulate appro-
priate subject matter and thus cannot constitute a
statutory process."'
However, while a process claim consisting solely of mathematical
operations is non-statutory whether or not it is performed on a
computer, the Guidelines state that a "process will receive statutory
protection if it is limited to a practical application of the abstract
idea or mathematical algorithm in the technological arts (i.e.,
involve some species of physical transformation of input data)."" 2
In summary, the Examination Guidelines depicted a harmonious
correlation between the PTO guidelines and the case law that has
traditionally been relied upon for analysis of inventions that
107 61 Fed. Reg. at 7479.
'0 Id. at 7484.
109 See supra pages 18 to 25 (discussing the Gottschalk trilogy of cases).
"o See supra, pages 25 to 35 (discussing the Freeman-Walter-Abele test).
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incorporate mathematical algorithms. This harmony would not last
long.
IV. THE STATE STREET DECISIONS
A. CASE BACKGROUND
The patent at issue, patent number 5,193,056 (the '056 patent),
currently is held by Signature Financial Group, Inc. by assignment
from Mr. Boes, the original registrant. 113 The patent issued in
March of 1993 and is entitled "[a] data processing system for Hub
and Spoke financial services configuration.""' The system avoids
legal restrictions against commingling assets of disparate mutual
funds by allowing for two or more mutual funds-so-called
Spokes-to combine their assets in a common second-generation
investment portfolio-the so-called hub."5  The purpose of such
an arrangement is to pool common expenses" 6 in order to realize
economies of scale and to reduce the proportionate fraction of
costs." 7 Additionally, such an arrangement results in tax advan-
tages,18 and allows for small funds (previously precluded from
operating due to prohibitively large expenses) to pool their assets
and to become attractive to investors." 9 However, the drawback,
113 Patent No. 5,193,056. The patent is available at the following web site: Intellectual
Property Network (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <httpJ/www.patents.ibm.com>.
114 Patent No. 5,193,056, Background of the invention. (" 'Hub and Spoke' [is a] service
mark of Signature Financial Group, Inc.") Id.
115 Id.
... Id. "To name just a few expenses, every fund ... pays an investment advisory fee to
an investment adviser who invests the fund's assets, custodian fees to a custodian for the
safekeeping of the fund's assets, portfolio accounting fees for the determination of the fund's
asset value and income ... an audit fee to the fund's independent accountants ... and a
legal fee...." Id.
117 Id. Having a large amount of assets results in various economies of scale in fund
operating costs and "[slince many of a fund's expenses are independent of the fund's asset
base, a larger fund asset base produces a lower operating expense ratio (expenses to assets),
which increases the net investment performance of the fund." Id.
1' Id. "As a partnership, [the hub] receives "flow-through" tax treatment and, so, the
[hub] does not pay taxes, but rather all economic gain or loss flows through to the [hub]
investors." Id.
"' Patent No. 5,193,056, Background of the invention. "[A] fund with a small amount of
assets, which ordinarily would not be a viable fund because it would have a prohibitively
high operating expense ratio, can now be established on a cost-effective basis by investing
19
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as the patent explains, is that such a hub and spoke configuration
presents "great administrative challenges." 2 °  For example,
because the partners (spokes) in the portfolio themselves are
mutual funds, their assets fluctuate daily as customers make
additional investments or withdrawals.' 2 ' Further compounding
the complexity are factors such as the rise or fall of the portfolio
asset values and the addition or complete removal of spokes from
the hub. In addition, the shares of the spoke mutual funds are
generally traded publicly, which means that the value of each of
the spokes must be calculated quickly and accurately to satisfy the
shareholders' demands for rapid performance evaluations.'22
To overcome such administerial difficulties, the '056 patent
provides a data processing system and method for monitoring and
recording the information flow and data necessary for maintaining
the partnership portfolio.123 The data processing system deter-
mines the percentage share (allocation ratio) that each fund has in
the portfolio, while taking into consideration daily changes both in
the value of the portfolio's investment securities (as determined by
market prices) and in the amount of each fund's assets (as deter-
mined by daily shareholder purchases and redemptions).'24 The
system also allocates to each fund the portfolio's daily income,
expenses, and net realized and unrealized gain or loss. 2 '
its assets in a [hub]. Id.1
2
1  d.
121 Id. The patent provides an example:
[C]onsider a portfolio made up of Funds A and B. Assume that at the
start of the day Fund A has $750,000 invested in the portfolio and Fund
B has $250,000 invested.... Next, assume that by the end of the day
the portfolio has not changed in value due to market fluctuations, but
that additional purchases by fund shareholders have given Fund A
$800,000 in assets and Fund B $275,000 in assets. The portfolio has
grown to $1,075,000 in assets, with Fund A having a 74.4% share [down
from 75%] and Fund B having a 25.6% share [up from 25%]. Id.
122 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1371,
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1599 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that "iln some instances, a mutual
fund administrator is required to calculate the value of the shares to the nearest penny
within as little as an hour and a half after the market closes. Given the complexity of the
calculations, a computer or equivalent device is a virtual necessity to perform the task.).
123 Patent No. 5,193,056, Abstract.
124 Id.
125 Patent No. 5,193,956, Summary of the Invention.
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Signature, the holder of the '056 patent is an administrator and
accounting agent for mutual funds.'26 State Street, a competitor
fund administrator, attempted to license the patented hub and
spoke process, possibly after realizing the potential value of such
a process, but negotiations failed.127  State Street subsequently
filed a declaratory judgment action to invalidate Signature's patent
for failure to claim a statutory subject matter under § 101 of the
Patent Act, because "the invention claims an unpatentable
mathematic algorithm as defined by established Supreme Court
precedent."28 Signature, on the other hand, declared that its
Hub and Spoke data processing system was a "computer-imple-
mented invention that is patentable both under recent Federal
Circuit precedent and guidelines for patent examiners issued by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office."'29
The adverse positions taken by the parties set the stage for a
promising conflict: Serious competitors, significant financial stakes,
and a wavering line of precedent.
B. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION: A SIMPLE APPLICATION OF
DOCTRINE
1. The Mathematical Algorithm Exception. The district court
framed the summary judgment issue as "whether computer
software that essentially performs mathematical accounting
functions and is configured to run on a [personal] computer is
patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101."13' The court seemed less than
enthused by the task at hand as it referred to the issue of software
patentability as a "jurisprudential quagmire."' 3' Thus, it was
'2 State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1598
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
127 id.
'2 State St. Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502,
506, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1530, 1534 (D. Mass 1996).
129 id.
130 Id. at 506.
131 Id. Referring to John A. Burtis, Towards a Rational Jurisprudence of Computer-
Related Patentability in Light of In re Alappat, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1129, (1995): "[The
question whether computer-related inventions driven by mathematically-based software
deserve the market protection afforded under federal patent law has vexed both theorists
and practitioners since computers entered the marketplace some thirty years ago."
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with unease that the court embarked on a treacherous voyage
through the history of the decisions regarding the patentability of
software implemented inventions under § 101. The court further
explained that, in light of the mathematical algorithm exception,
the determination of patentability for computer software is quite a
difficult task "because a computer program directs the computer to
perform mathematical functions (i.e., process data) to achieve a
desired result." 132
The lower court's analysis of the '056 patent began with an
application of the Freeman-Walter-Abele mathematical algorithm
test.133  Thus, the first question was whether the patent recited
a mathematical algorithm, 134 and under the Benson decision,
indicia of mathematical algorithms may include any series of
"mathematical operations or calculations." 135  The court deter-
mined that while the '056 patent did not recite a mathematical
formula directly, "the data processing system is an apparatus
specifically designed to solve a mathematical problem."" 6 In
particular, the court found that three of the patent claims recited
"calculating data as a function of the machine" in determining
items such as the allocation of income, expenses, gains, and losses
for each spoke, as well as determining each spoke's percentage
share in the hub considering daily market fluctuations. 37 An
invention that inputs, processes, and outputs numbers, the court
concluded, must by definition perform mathematical operations,
132 State St. Bank and Trust Co., 927 F. Supp. 502, 508, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1530 (D.
Mass. 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Jur Strobos, Stalking the Elusive Patentable
Software: Are there still Diehr or was it just a Flook?, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 363, 377 (1993),
supra note 58, at 377 as stating that "[a] computer program is nothing more than a series
of mathematical steps conducted by a machine composed of electronic switches and storage
sites").
133 927 F. Supp. at 513.134 id.
135Id.
1
" Id. (noting that the patent claim clearly contemplated a solution to a mathematical
problem).
137 State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 513. The court analogized its analysis to In re Schrader,
where the court held that the method for grouping bids at an auction using linear
mathematical programming to maximize the seller's revenue constituted "the solving of a
mathematical problem: determining the optimal combination of bids." In re Schrader, 22
F.3d 290, 293, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1455, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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and thus satisfies the first prong of the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test.
138
Once the mathematical algorithm prong is satisfied, the Free-
man-Walter-Abele test dictates that the inquiry should proceed to
the "physicality test,"3 9 which determines whether "the claim
would be 'otherwise statutory'. . . albeit inoperative or less useful
without the algorithm."4" Should the response to this inquiry be
in the affirmative, then the claim likewise presents statutory
subject matter when the algorithm is included.'4
The court in State Street held that Signature's Hub and Spoke
patent did not satisfy this test, because "like other accounting
methods, it is designed to manipulate and record numbers." 42
The court distinguished the case at hand from Arrhythmia by the
fact that "[u]nlike the electrocardiograph in Arrhythmia
Signature's data processing system does not 'involve the transfor-
mation or conversion of subject matter representative of or
constituting physical activity or objects.' ""13 While the court
acknowledged the fact that mathematical calculations were, indeed,
part of the patent claim in Arrhythmia, the court emphasized that
the invention rather ought to be viewed as a method of analyzing
EKG signals for the purpose of determining a specified heart activi-
ty.'" The distinction between the two systems, the court conclud-
ed, was that in Arrhythmia, "'the number obtained [was] not a
mathematical abstraction; it [was] a measure in microvolts of a
specified heart activity, an indicator of the risk of ventricular
tachycardia.' ""'
Similarly, the court distinguished Alappat by the fact that
Signature's patent does "nothing other than present and solve a
" State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 513.
13 Id.
'40 In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682, 686 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
1 Id.
'42 State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 514.
'4 Id. (citing Schrader, 22 F.3d at 294). Specifically, the court declared that the patent
in Arrhythmia "enabled a certain type of human heart activity to be measured, processed,
and displayed electronically." Id.
144 Id.
1 4 Id. (citing Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1060,
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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mathematical algorithm and, therefore, is not patentable." 46
Rather, Alappat's invention that would manipulate signal waveform
displays "physically converted the input data into a new and totally
different form."'47 Again, the court noted that the Alappat inven-
tion concededly did employ a computer-implemented mathematical
algorithm, 4 ' but relied on the Alappat court's conclusion that the
rasteriser invention constituted a physical transformation,'49
which went beyond a mere manipulation of mathematical abstrac-
tions. 5
0
In summary, as the court found neither a transformation of
subject matter representative of physical activities or objects nor a
conversion of data into a different form, it concluded that the
invention merely recited a change of one set of numbers into
another, which it held insufficient to confer patent protection.' 5 '
Indeed, "[tihe same functions could be performed, albeit less
efficiently, by an accountant armed with pencil, paper, calculator,
and a filing system."'52
The court found support for its conclusion in the Schrader
decision, which held nonstatutory an algorithm to maximize auction
revenues. Schrader's computer implemented method to compile,
process, and store business data failed to secure patent protection
because, consistently with Arrhythmia, the court was unable to find
any physical aspect related to bids. Thus, the Schrader court
concluded, "the grouping or regrouping of bids cannot constitute a
physical change, effect, or result."53 In summary, with respect
to the mathematical algorithm exception, the district court simply
applied clear and well-known precedent to the facts, which yielded
14 Id. at 514.
147 State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 514 (emphasis added).
148/d.
149 Id. "[That is,] discrete waveform data samples into anti-aliased pixel illumination data
to be displayed on a display means." Id.
'" Id. at 514 (noting the dissent of Archer, C.J., arguing that" 'rasterizer is simply the
mathematical conversion of data' which should not be patentable." In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526, 1564, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
'r" State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 514. "Quite simply, it involves no further physical
transformation or reduction than inputting numbers, calculating numbers, outputting
numbers, and storing numbers." Id.
152 Id. at 515.
1 Id. at 514 (quoting Schrader, 22 F.3d at 293-94) (emphasis added).
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2. The Business Method Exception. The district court proceeded
by subjecting Signature's claim to the patentable subject matter
analysis under the business method exception.'54 The opinion
cited Loew's Drive-In Theatres'55 for one of the early statements
that "business methods are unpatentable abstract ideas""6 as
well as some of the later cases supporting this doctrine.'57 While
the court noted Judge Newman's vigorous dissent in Schrader,
where she argued that the method of doing business exception
ought to be "described as error-prone, redundant and obsolete," 58
the court proceeded to apply the doctrine as if business were as
usual. The court focused on the preclusive effect that exclusive
ownership resulting from a patent on the invention would have:
If Signature's invention were patentable, any finan-
cial institution desirous of implementing a multi-
tiered funding complex modelled on a Hub and Spoke
configuration would be required to seek Signature's
permission before embarking on such a project....
In effect, the '056 Patent grants Signature a monopo-
ly on its idea of a multi-tiered partnership portfolio
investment structure; patenting an accounting
system necessary to carry on a certain type of busi-
154 Id. at 515.
1" Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 81 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 149 (1st Cir. 1934).
'5 State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 515. The Loew's Drive-In Theatres court equated the
method of doing business doctrine with the abstract idea doctrine:
Thus a system for the transaction of business, such, for example, as the
cafeteria system for transacting the restaurant business, or similarly the
open-air drive-in system for conducting the motion picture theatre
business, however novel, useful, or commercially successful is not
patentable apart from the means for making the system practically
useful, or carrying it out. 174 F.2d at 552.
... Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908); In re Alappat, 33
F.3d 1526, 31 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 12 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1824 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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ness is tantamount to a patent on the business
itself. 159
As a result, the district court held that Signature's '056 patent was
directed to non-statutory subject matter, because both methods of
doing business and mathematical algorithms constitute unpatent-
able abstract ideas. 60  The district court probably overreacted
somewhat in its articulation of an overprotective concern for the
market effects of a potential patent on Signature's invention. This
response may very well have been the spark that ignited the
conflagration which resulted in the reversal by the Federal Circuit
that would jettison the business method exception altogether. In
so doing, however, the Federal Circuit would become equally guilty
of overreaction-both in kind and in degree.
C. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT OPINION: A DOCTRINAL UPROOTING
As expected, Signature appealed the district court's grant of
summary judgment and the parties were back in the courtroom
within two years at the Federal Circuit,'6 ' which has jurisdiction
over patent appeals.'62 Judge Giles S. Rich wrote the opinion,
holding that Signature's claim was not unpatentable under the
mathematical algorithm exception and, furthermore, that there is
no such thing as a business method exception to patentability. 63
As a preliminary matter, the court noted that § 101 of the Patent
Act states that "[wihoever invents or discovers any new and useful
159 State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 516. The court stated that the '056 Patent is claimed
sufficiently broadly to foreclose virtually any computer-implemented accounting method
necessary to manage this type of financial structure. Indeed, during licensing negotiations,
Signature informed State Street that any data processing system designed to perform book
accounting for a multi-tiered fund based on a partnership portfolio configuration would
infringe the '056 Patent. Id.
One may then wonder why the court did not dispose of the apparently pressing question
of virtual business monopoly by rejecting the patent for simply being drafted overbroadly.
'60 State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 516.
161 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1999)
(No. 98-657).
16 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1994).
163 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370. The Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory
construction issue de novo. Id.
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process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvements thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor. ... ""'4 The plain and unambiguous meaning of § 101,
the court stated, "is that any invention falling within one of the
four stated categories of statutory subject matter [that is, process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter] may be patented
provided it meets [the requirements of sections] 102, 103, and
112."15 The court interpreted the congressional intent behind
the twice appearing use of "any" in § 101 as simply placing no
further restrictions on patentable subject matter beyond those
specifically recited in § 101.' With this mindset, the court set
out to reverse history.
1. Mathematical Algorithm Exception Revisited. The court
declared that the district court had erroneously applied the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test to seek out an unpatentable abstract
idea in Signature's claim.'67 For purposes of determining patent-
able subject matter, the court stated that the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test has "little, if any, applicability."' This is so, the court
explained, because "a process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter employing a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or
abstract idea is patentable subject matter even though a law of
nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea would not, by itself
be entitled to such protection."'69
Because the use of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test to sniff out
mathematical algorithms tended to have the practical effect of
precluding patents for lack of patentable subject matter under
14 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).
165 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1372 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 1373. The court cited the famous quotation from the Supreme Court decision
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty as support for this proposition: "Congress intended § 101 to
extend to 'anything under the sun that is made by man.'" Id. (citing Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). This quotation originated in the Committee Reports
that accompanied the 1952 Patent Act. See S. Rep. No. 82-1979 at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No.
82-1923 at 6 (1952).
'67 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373.
'
6 8 Id. at 1374.
" Id. "The dispositive inquiry is whether the claim as a whole is directed to statutory
subject matter. It is irrelevant that a claim may contain, as part of the whole, subject matter
which would not be patentable by itself." Id. at 1374 n.6. In essence this is the equivalent
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Gottschalk taken alone, the court emphasized that the complete
Gottschalk trilogy should be used. 7 ' Thus, the inclusion of a
mathematical algorithm of some form in a patent claim would not
automatically invalidate it for lack of statutory subject matter as
long as its operation produces a "useful, concrete and tangible
result."' Finally, the court held that, for purposes of the statu-
tory subject matter requirement mandated by § 101, Signature's
claim "admittedly produces" such a useful, concrete, and tangible
result.'72 Thus, the court concluded, § 101 was satisfied even
though the "useful result is expressed in numbers, such as price,
profit, percentage, cost, or loss."'73
What, then, is the practical effect of this holding? While previous
courts have long alluded to the fact that the Freeman-Walter-Abele
inquiry is superfluous,'74 the State Street court drove the last nail
into its coffin by holding that "every step-by-step process, be it
electronic or chemical or mechanical, involves an algorithm in the
broad sense of the term."75
2. The Business Method Exception Annihilated. The Federal
Circuit Court also revisited the district court's alternative ground
for invalidating Signature's '056 patent-the business method
exception. In addressing the doctrine, the court exerted no effort
whatsoever to cloak its intentions in obscure language: "We take
this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest."'76 In
so doing, the State Street court echoed the very words Judge
Newman had articulated in her pointed dissent in Schrader.177
In the place of a business method analysis after the Patent Act
'70 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1374.
171 Id. at 1374 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545,
1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
172 Id. at 1375.
173 id.
174 Judge Rich stated that "[als the Supreme Court expressly stated in Diehr, its own
holdings in Benson and Flook 'stand for no more than these long-established principles' that
abstract ideas and natural phenomena are not patentable." Id. at 1374 n.7 (citing Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 7-8 (1981)).
175 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1602 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Jan. 11,
1999) (No. 98-657) (quoting In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908,
1911 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
'7 Id. at 1375.
177In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1455, 1461-62 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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of 1952, the court declared, claims should be, and should have been,
subject to the "same legal requirements for patentability as applied
to any other process or method."7 ' In fact, the court went as far
as declaring that "[tihe business method exception has never been
invoked by this court, or the CCPA to deem an invention unpatent-
able."' 79 The court explained, as did Judge Newman in Schrader,
that the decisions commonly thought to have applied the business
method exception actually applied "some clearer concept of Title 35
or, more commonly, application of the abstract idea exception based
on finding a mathematical algorithm."80 The decision should not
have caught those in the intellectual property circles by surprise.
After all, subsequent to the figurative u-turn that the PTO made in
its policy towards business methods as stated in the revised
guidelines of 1996, courts had little reason not to follow the PTO's
lead.
V. THE AFTERMATH
Prior to the State Street decision, various business organizations
in the financial and insurance sectors may have declined to
consider patent protection for their innovations as traditional
analysis under the mathematical algorithm and business method
exception would have deemed such a venture as highly unlikely to
succeed."8' In lieu of a patent protection scheme, companies have
relied on trade secret protection for business methods, because
trade secrets can encompass any formula, method, or process that
178 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375.
As Judge Newman has previously stated, [The business method
exception] is ... an unwarranted encumbrance to the definition of
statutory subject matter in section 101. ... Patentability [turns on]
whether the method, viewed as a whole, meets the requirements of
patentability as set forth in Sections 102, 103, and 112 of the Patent Act.
Id. at 1375 n.10 (citing Schrader, 22 F.3d at 298).
'79 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375; see also Del Gallo, supra note 36, at 435 (dubbing the
business method exception "a robe without substance").
180 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375; see also Schrader, 22 F.3d at 298 (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (stating that '[a]ll of the 'doing business' cases could have been decided using the
clearer concepts of Title 35").
181 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502,
513-14, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1530, 1541-42 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding that a physical
transformation of some sort is a prerequisite for a mathematical algorithm claim).
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derives economic value from not being already known to the
public." 2 However, by employing business methods online as
many electronic commerce businesses do, 8 ' protection for trade
secrets may not be available because secrecy, which is the essential
element of trade secret protection,"& may be lost when computer
code is observable by the public.8 5 Thus, patent protection would
be the only practical means of guarding such inventions from
infringement.
In the aftermath of the Federal Circuit's adjudication of State
Street, however, the industry might reconsider pursuing patent
protection for their innovations and developments. In fact,
notwithstanding uncertainty about the long-term effects of the
decision, the PTO already experienced a significant increase in the
number of applications for business method patent applications in
the six months pending the Supreme Court's denial of a petition for
writ of certiorari.'86
The invalidation of the business method doctrine is not the only
aspect of the State Street decision that will have significant effects
on future patent claims. In holding that the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test was antiquated and deserved to be retired, the Federal Circuit
opened significantly broader avenues for the financial industry to
pursue patent protection for their inventions. As explained earlier,
once a mathematical algorithm was identified under the old
Freeman-Walter-Abele test, the algorithm had to be applied to
182 See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 14, § 2.03, at p. 2-8 (stating that "[a] trade secret may
reside in any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is used in one's
business. . .).
la Some forecasts predict that revenue from electronic commerce may reach $3.2 trillion
by the year 2003. Linda Himelstein et al., Why they're nuts about the net, BUS. WV. 51, Nov.
23, 1998.
184 See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 14, § 2.05, at p. 2-10 (stating that while most courts
do not require absolute secrecy, a substantial element of secrecy is required).
1 Glen B. Choi, Patents offer real value to businesses in cyberspace, 3 No. 7 CYBERSPACE
LAW, 5 Oct. 1998. For example, where a business method includes a web page embedded
with a self-executing subroutine, secrecy may be lost when the subroutine is observable
through a user interface. Id.
1
" Carol B. Oberdorfer, Patents: 'Boom' in Business Method Patent Filings Has Followed
'State Street' Ruling, PTO Says, BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY NEWS, Dec.
10, 1998 (stating that the PTO projects an excess of 300 business method patent applications
to be filed within one year).
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physical elements or process steps in .order to be patentable.18
After the Federal Circuit ruling, however, the focus is merely on
whether the algorithm produces a useful, concrete, and tangible
result.
But why strive towards patent protection in the first place? If a
company holds patents covering business methods that others want
to use, patent licensing offers vast advantages over licensing
business methods that are only protected as trade secrets. In a
patent license, the patent holder is in a position of strength because
the patent holder may assert the patent against a potential
licensee." In contrast, a potential licensee of a trade secret may
be unwilling to pay royalties for use of a business method because
prior to an enforcement action in court, there is no conclusive
showing that the business method is a protected trade secret.18 9
The potential licensee may demand lower royalties because of the
risk that others may use the business method for free! Thus, under
the unanimous State Street holding, the future of patent protection
for e-commerce is already here with its obvious potential advantag-
es to a patent holder. While some companies in the financial sector
may already have amassed significant patents on their software-
implemented financial innovations, the Federal Circuit's very
recent change in its doctrinal standpoint may very well have caught
Wall Street by surprise. Perhaps it will simply take gargantuan
damage awards for infringement, not uncommon in other areas of
the law, to wake the financial industry up.
VI. WAS THE STATE STREET DECISION EVEN NECESSARY?
While the rejection of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test results in a
removal of obstacles to patent protection for inventions that
incorporate mathematical algorithms, 9 ° the actual change in the
overall analysis is minimal. Prior to State Street, the test sought
187 See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of satisfying
the transformation inquiry).
18 Choi, supra note 185.
189 Id.
190 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1601-02 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Jan.
11, 1999) (No. 98-657).
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to determine first whether a mathematical algorithm was expressed
in some form in the invention. If so, the second inquiry would save
the invention from being deemed nonpatentable subject matter if
the invention performed a transformation of some sort. All that
State Street accomplished was a simple reversal of the inquiry: if
a transformation of some sort occurs, then the invention is
patentable.' Thus, the holding may only stand for a shift to a
presumption of validity, provided that some transformation takes
place (a minimal requirement indeed, considering that the calcula-
tion of dollar amounts now can satisfy a finding of a "concrete
result"). Such a minuscule shift in presumption should, however,
not be ignored-after all, it may mean the difference between a
finding of patent validity and nothing at all.
The decision at hand might modestly be deemed at the forefront
of the evolution of patent protection. The recent shifting tends to
show that an ever increasing focus is placed on protection of the
economic interests of a business. While this development may be
difficult to control under the pressure of a gigantic cumulative mass
of enterprise interest, it may be worthwhile to pause for a few
moments in order to consider whether this is a proper course to
strike. After all, can the protection of a Hub and Spoke configura-
tion of a financial enterprise really be so malleable as to assume
any shape or function that "promote[s] the progress of science?"'92
Probably not. In the future, courts considering any expansion of
patent protection into non-scientific arenas ought to consider the
path upon which they embark, because the path may very well lead
to a backfiring, economic self-destruction. After all, as patent
prosecution is secret, 9 ' nobody can tell how many applications for
patents covering e-commerce inventions currently are processed by
the PTO. Thus, many e-commerce companies will inevitably have
to face the choice of either paying royalties to competitors or
defending themselves in expensive patent litigation suits. Further-
more, upstart companies may find it increasingly difficult to secure
financing for their endeavors as venture capitalists undoubtedly
will consider the possibility of conflicting patent protection held by
-' Id. at 1374.
'92 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
'93 See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994) (providing for the confidentiality of patent applications).
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competitors as significant risks to their investments. The ironic
result may, therefore, be that the very patent protection of
anything under the sun made by man, commonly thought to protect
and promote business methods, actually threatens to strangle any
further development!
The federal circuit could easily have avoided the hazard of a
future jurisprudential quagmire and yet obtained the result in
State Street without rescinding the business method exception.
Specifically, the court should have recognized the vast difference
between a method of doing business and a method used in doing
business. 194 An example may shed light on this minute distinc-
tion.
Imagine a hypothetical parcel distribution company. In light of
increased competition, the management strives to cut the package
handling costs. One method devised by the company engineers
entails consolidation of packages with common destination points
into large containers, such that repeated and redundant sorting of
the individual packages can be avoided at processing nodes in the
distribution network. The use of bar-code scanning technology to
separate packages to be consolidated clearly might be patentable
(subject, of course, to a novelty analysis, etc.) notwithstanding it
being a "method used in doing business". On the other hand, the
broad concept of consolidation of packages to minimize sorting costs
would not qualify for patent protection because it merely consti-
tutes a theory in the abstract, a "method of doing business".' 9'
The constitutional grant of patent protection seeks, as Justice
Story asserted in a very early case, to promote the development of
science and the useful arts, whereby reward to individual inventors
is merely a means to an end.19 6 The most fundamental purpose
of a business method, however, is to reward individual businessmen
for their industry. In other words, the nature of the progress in
business is such that further development of business methods are
stimulated by the market driven economy, whereby external
incentives (such as patent protection) are superfluous.
194 Michael L. Fuelling, Manufacturing, selling, and accounting: Patenting business
methods, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 471, 472 (1994).
196 See Fuller v. Yentzer, 94 U.S. 288, 288 (1876) (stating that a patent will not be held
valid for a mere abstraction).
1 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 19 (1829).
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Consider the possibilities had the business method exception not
existed when the drive-through concept was introduced to fast food
restaurants. Quite possibly, in the absence of the business methods
exception, enterprises such as McDonald's could have secured
patent protection for that abstract business idea. With the benefit
of hindsight, however, it seems quite clear that the market economy
by itself fuelled the development and improvement of drive-through
food establishments.
The concept of a business method exception has, however,
rightfully been called "fuzzy."'97  Courts and commentators
striving to remove the doctrine have pointed out that no decisions
have ever invalidated patents simply by constituting "business
methods." Rather, the critics assert, those decisions could have
been resolved by relying on the statutory requirements of patent-
ability such as novelty and unobviousness." 98 Unfortunately, the
critics fail to take note that the statutory requirements do not take
into consideration the self-propelling nature of the economic
incentives inherent in business methods. Thus, a category of
business methods should remain as a "suspect class" of patents
which should be subject to extra careful scrutiny. After all, neither
the "fuzziness" of the doctrine nor the fact that it has never been
expressly relied upon to invalidate any patents invalidate its
utility. To the contrary, the fact that courts have rejected nearly
every patent claim for which the business method exception has
been invoked, may very well support the idea that a business
method classification subjects the claim to a higher degree of
scrutiny.
Of course, considering the PTO's recent doctrinal turnaround, the
Federal Circuit's holding in the State Street case, and last-but not
least-the Supreme Court's denial of a petition for certiorari, it is
highly unlikely that the business method exception will ever be
seriously raised again. But this may become an issue that the
legislature will have to consider, just as Congress recently char-
tered a new course with respect to patents for medical procedures
by specifically prohibiting enforceability of patents for medical
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procedures. 199 In the meantime, the practitioner can rest assured
that after the business method exception disappeared with State
Street, business will never be as usual again.
CLAUS D. MELARTI
' 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
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